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Articles
Aggregation and Choice of Law
Edward H. Cooper*
INTRODUCTION
This is more a conversational gambit than an article. I
address a question at the intersection of procedure and choice of
law, speaking as a proceduralist rather than a choice-of-law
scholar. The question - which may be two questions - addresses
the potential interdependence of procedural aggregation devices
and choice of law. One part of the question is whether
aggregation can justifiably change the choice of law made for some
part of an aggregated proceeding. The other part is whether
choice-of-law principles can be adapted to facilitate procedurally
desirable aggregation. Answers may be sought either in abstract
theory or in theory informed by some attention to practical
concerns. Either way, it seems likely that resistance to
interdependent adjustments will come from the choice-of-law
perspective more than the procedural perspective.
It is important to define aggregation as used in this
question before summarizing the conclusion. Aggregation means
any expansion of a lawsuit beyond a single claim by one plaintiff
against one defendant. If "claim" is taken in the meaning adopted
* Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. The
author is Reporter for the United States Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; nothing in these remarks
reflects any work done for the Committee.
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for res judicata claim preclusion, indeed, even a single claim may
involve aggregation in a meaningful sense when it includes
separate theories - including theories derived from different
sources of law - and distinctive facts relevant to one theory but
not another. Class actions have provoked the most extensive
discussion of the interaction between aggregation and choice of
law. Because they have received so much attention, as
exemplified by Professor Silberman's paper,1 they will receive only
incidental attention here.
In the end, my answers are not only tentative. They are
also ambivalent. There is a strong claim that large-scale
aggregations of parties justify choices of law that would not be
made if each element in the aggregation were the subject of a
separate action. The justifications run in both directions - the
choice facilitates the procedural advantages of aggregation, and
aggregation facilitates a choice of law that yields overall more
satisfactory results than those that would be achieved by separate
actions. Smaller-scale aggregation presents more difficult
questions. It seems likely that choice of law should seldom be
affected by joinder of a relatively modest number of parties,
although voluntary joinder may at times justify a different choice.
The suggestion that aggregation and choice of law may
affect each other rests on a belief that the choice process should
move beyond consideration of the conflicting rules and the policies
and interests specifically associated with those rules. Events that
entangle two or more law-giving jurisdictions invoke additional
interests often referred to in the choice-of-law process. There are
shared interests in uniformity of outcome, interests that are
associated with equal treatment of actors caught up in
indistinguishable events. The interest in uniformity and quality
is bolstered by the interest in mutual accommodation, the
recognition that subordination of event-specific interests of any
particular jurisdiction for that set of events will be repaid by
subordination of others' interests when another set of events
comes to be litigated. In addition, there is an interest in the
efficient and consistent application of whatever set of rules is
1. Linda Silberman, Choice of Law in National Class Actions: Should
CAFA Make A Difference?, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 54 (forthcoming
Apr. 2009).
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chosen. This interest is better served by aggregation than by
repeated litigation in multiple forums.
INCIDENTAL AND INESCAPABLE EFFECTS
The least interesting observation is that the fact of
aggregation affects choice because it is simpler to choose a single
law. The greater the proliferation of claims and parties, the
greater the prospect that a court will choose for some combination
of issues and parties a different law than it would have chosen
had that particular combination been presented in a stand-alone
dispute. Whether or not this seems undesirable, it does not seem
likely that courts will avoid all traces of this effect. It can be
recognized and fought against by arguing for sound choices, but it
is likely to endure.
Beyond the ease of avoiding hard choices lie inescapable
effects of aggregation on choice of law that become more
interesting as they come to seem more nearly avoidable.
Examples are noted simply to illustrate the point. A defendant
faced with a compulsory counterclaim rule is forced to submit a
claim to a court that may make a different choice of law than
would be made by the court the defendant would choose for an
independent action. The defendant might argue that the court,
having compelled assertion of the counterclaim, cannot properly
apply its own choice rules but must instead adopt the choice rules
that would be used by the court the defendant asserts as the
preferred court. That argument does not seem likely to succeed.
A plaintiff required by claim preclusion to advance both
federal and state theories in support of a single claim may be
driven to select the court preferred for one theory, bypassing
another court that would be preferred - and might make a
different choice of law - for the other theory. Although it seems
less likely, it might also be that claim preclusion could require
joining, as parts of a single claim, demands for relief that might
better be governed by the laws of different states. An example
may be provided by White Plains Coat & Apron Co. v. Cintas,
described below. 2 Again, the forum is not likely to surrender its
own choice principles, even when they are forced on a federal court
2. 460 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2006).
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by the obligation to adopt local rules. 3
More subtle examples may occur. The availability of an
alternative forum that can compel broad party joinder is one
factor that influences Civil Rule 19(b)4 determinations to dismiss
for nonjoinder of a Rule 19(a) party. Suppose a desirable party is
subject to personal jurisdiction only in another state whose courts
would make a different choice of law for all parties. Here there is
room to account for the different choices in ruling on aggregation.
But how far should the initial court take account of the different
choice in determining whether, "in equity and good conscience," it
should proceed without the absent party? Does it make a
difference whether it prefers its own choice, or whether it would
prefer the choice likely to be made by an alternative court free to
operate under different choice principles? Klaxon submission to
forum-state choice rules could easily lead a federal court to prefer
the choice rules of an alternative forum. 5 It cannot achieve that
result by a § 1404 transfer, 6 but it can by dismissing for inability
to join a Rule 19(b) party.
Finally, the effects of personal jurisdiction on choice of law
should be noted among the incidental effects of aggregation.
Aggregation of parties and claims can readily justify an assertion
of personal jurisdiction as to a party or claim that would not be
made if that party or claim were the subject of an independent
action in the same court. This expansion is easily accepted in
federal courts; 28 U.S.C. § 1697, 7 supporting the single-event
mass-disaster jurisdiction established by § 1369,8 is an obvious
3. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b )(4) advisory committee's note ("The fourth factor,
looking to the practical effects of a dismissal, indicates that the court should
consider whether there is any assurance that the plaintiff, if dismissed, could
sue effectively in another forum where better joinder would be possible").
5. SeeKlaxon, 313 U.S. 487.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)
(In Van Dusen, the Supreme Court held that the substantive law that would
be chosen by the transferor state should apply when a defendant requests a
transfer of a state law claim).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1697 (Supp. V 2005) ("When the jurisdiction of the district
court is based in whole or in part upon section 1369 of this title, process,
other than subpoenas, may be served at any place within the United States,
or anywhere outside the United States if otherwise permitted by law").
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. V 2005) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action involving minimal diversity between
2009]
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example. The Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act 9 - which, if
adopted, could be used to aggregate litigation among courts in
different states - offers two illustrations that would expand
state-court jurisdiction. Section 103 authorizes a court that lacks
personal jurisdiction of a party to assert sufficient authority over
the party to transfer the action to a court that does have personal
jurisdiction. Choosing the receiving court could easily affect the
choice of law made in deciding the action. Section 203 authorizes
a receiving court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party that
was within the personal jurisdiction of the transferring court even
though the receiving court would not independently have personal
jurisdiction. Here too transfer could affect the choice of law. The
Act should be adopted everywhere, but has not yet been adopted
anywhere. But more routine expansions of state-court personal
jurisdiction to reflect the needs and opportunities of multiparty
litigation can have similar choice-of-law effects.
PERMISSIVE EFFECTS
A. Choice Without Aggregation
The interesting question beyond these incidental or
inescapable effects is whether a court may properly take account
of aggregation by choosing for some part of an aggregated
litigation a law that it would not choose for that same part if it
were presented in isolation as the sole subject of an independent
action. The question is interesting only on a more or less relaxed
view of choice principles. In theory it may not seem to be a
question, much less an interesting question, if you believe that
there is, in the nature of law, a single correct choice to govern each
issue as between a single two-party pair. So confident an
approach to choice of law could parallel the little-lamented "vested
rights" view, asserting that it is unjust or even unlawful to make
any but the single correct choice among the laws of two or more
law-giving jurisdictions touched by a litigated event. But that
adverse parties that arises from a single accident, where at least 75 natural
persons have died in the accident at a discrete location").
9. See Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the
ALI Project With the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REV. 897
(1994).
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position can be defended only by also answering the very question
being put - whether the "correct" choice should be influenced by
the opportunities of aggregate litigation.
The question might be made somewhat more interesting by
noting that even if there is a single correct choice for every issue
and party pair, courts and commentators commonly fail to agree
on what that answer is. If the single correct answer will often be
missed, it might be argued that courts might as well choose the
law that furthers the advantages of aggregation when faced with
an uncertain choice between competing alternatives. At best, that
is an argument by default that will not please many true
believers.
The next step toward the aggregation questions does not
involve any regard for the shape of litigation. It can arise in a
single action between two parties stemming from a common
course of conduct that touches more than one state. The
proposition to be tested is that the multistate character of events
generates interests beyond those implicit in the competing rules,
the policies that underlie those rules, and the interests that arise
from the competing rules and policies considered alone. Among
those interests are mutual accommodation and equality of
treatment. Ease of disposition also may count for something. An
illustration is provided by White Plains Coat & Apron Co. The
defendant persuaded 35 of the plaintiffs linens customers to
switch to the defendant. Twenty-eight of the customers were
located in, and served from, New York; four were located in, and
served from, Connecticut; and three were located in, and served
from, New Jersey. After noting that the plaintiffs contracts chose
New York law, the court found it more important that "the alleged
tort substantially occurred in New York," and the vast majority of
the harm occurred in New York because the plaintiff was a New
York company headquartered there. Thus "New York has the
greatest interest in regulating the conduct in question" and New
York law applies. Does this result frustrate the interests of
Connecticut and New Jersey? Or may it further the interests of
all three states in reaching a uniform result as to a single course
of conduct inflicting an essentially common injury? Reflect that
the benefit to New York of vindicating its substantive policy
preferences in this case may be repaid by vindicating the
substantive policy preferences of Connecticut or New Jersey when
2009]
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the balance of events is different.
If the Second Circuit was right, the reason is that multiple
lawgivers share interests that transcend the interests specific to
particular substantive rules. When the question arises from more
than a single transaction or event, the choice of law may be
different than it would have been for some of the underlying
components, even if they are closely related.
B. Aggregation Effects
(1) Large-Scale Aggregation
And so the stage is set for the real question. The effects of
aggregation on choice of law are not addressed by the proposition
that the multiplication of related claims shapes the interests
affected by the choice. Should aggregation affect the choice of law
in such multistate events? If aggregation is accomplished for
purposes of efficient litigation, can the cause of efficiency justify a
simplified choice of law? Or, more daringly, may aggregation be
used for the purpose of changing the choices that would be made
in separate actions?
The case for shaping choice rules to recognize the needs and
opportunities of aggregation is most readily made in
circumstances that involve large numbers of parties in many
states. An illustration can be built out of one of the nonclass
proceedings involved in the diet drug litigation. In re Brisco o
involved "intermediate opt-outs" from the class settlement. 450
plaintiffs filed 127 separate suits in Texas courts, naming as
defendants both the drug manufacturer, Wyeth, and treating
physicians. The manufacturer removed to federal court; the cases
were transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for §
1407 consolidated pretrial proceedings. The court in Pennsylvania
decided the diversity-destroying physicians were "fraudulently
joined" because Texas limitations law clearly barred the claims
against them. So far there is no choice problem, only a risk the
court may be wrong in its understanding of Texas limitations law.
But suppose like numbers of opt-out individual actions were
brought in several other states, removed, and consolidated. Under
10. 448 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2006).
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present approaches, § 1407 consolidation is only for pretrial
purposes.'1 As Elizabeth Cabraser's paper illustrates, the choice-
of-law rules of the transferring courts carry into the consolidated
proceedings.12 It is not yet possible to seize the opportunity of
consolidation to establish uniform substantive rules that apply
equally to all plaintiffs and the defendant as well. And the need to
account for multiple substantive rules impedes the procedural
advantages that might be gained by consolidation.
There is something disconcerting about the common
assumption that there is no help for it - that when people in 50
different states and still other jurisdictions are affected alike by a
uniform course of conduct, it is necessary to deny recovery to some
and to allow different measures of recovery to others by making
choices among different laws. To be sure, patterns of similarity
are likely to emerge, paring the choice down to far fewer than 50
different laws for each issue. But a diligent issue-by-issue
approach is likely to yield a substantial number of different rules
sets for different party pairs. We accept that outcome readily
enough when it is actually a series of outcomes of numerous
individual actions, or of actions that involve small-scale party
aggregations. Acceptance, however, can be seen as a result of
necessity. We have no system for coordinating the choices made
by many different courts even - and perhaps especially - in
large numbers of individual actions. Why should we not work
toward means of aggregation that make it possible to treat alike
all of those who become involved in the same series of events?
Like treatment can be both substantive and procedural, and the
like procedural treatment can be achieved at lower cost than we
pay for repeated litigation and repeated settlements. Although
there may be some value in deferring the aggregation until there
has been some experience with individual litigation - until, in the
common phrase, the dispute has "matured" by developing the best
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000) ("When civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may
be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings") (emphasis added).
12. Elizabeth Cabraser, Just Choose: The Jurisprudential Necessity To
Select A Single Governing Law for Mass Claims Arising from Nationally
Marketed Consumer Goods and Services, 14 RoGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 29
(forthcoming Feb. 2009).
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available common fact basis for decision - there comes a point
when aggregation and common treatment are highly attractive.
The value of achieving equality is most pressing in extreme
cases that involve a few outliers, or even just one, in the general
run of the law. One state bars product-liability claims against
drug manufacturers for injuries caused by a drug approved by the
FDA so long as the approval process was not tainted by fraud.
Forty-nine states allow claims arising from use of a particular
FDA-approved drug: if claimants from the one no-liability state
can be aggregated into a single action with claimants from the
other 49 states, should they be denied recovery?
The price of homogenizing substantive law by the choices
made to govern consolidated proceedings is apparent. The choice
is likely to confer benefits on some participants as compared to the
law that would be chosen for them in individual proceedings,
while imposing comparable costs on others, both claimants and
defendants. These advantages may be offset to some extent by the
procedural advantages of aggregation, but there is no reason to
suppose that procedural advantage will always outweigh
procedural disadvantage.
Current approaches implicitly weigh the competing
concerns and opt to apply to aggregations, even the largest
aggregations, the same choice principles as apply to individual
two-party actions. The question is whether these current
approaches should be reconsidered, either for multidistrict
consolidation of cases in the federal courts or more generally. Can
the case be made, not merely in procedural terms but also in
grander choice-of-law terms for adopting different choice
principles for large-scale aggregations? And if the case can be
made, are there means to accomplish the result?
There is enough experience to suggest large-scale
aggregation will be necessary to achieve any general change.
Asking many different courts to achieve a consensus choice of law
in repeated actions, working to follow the first persuasive leader,
is asking the improbable. Aggregation seems the only likely
means. It is common to think of the federal courts as the more
likely host for the aggregation, in part because they are national
in scope and in part because it is far easier to contemplate a single
act of federal legislation than to contemplate coordination of state
courts by such means as uniform legislation or interstate compact.
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But state courts should not be counted out of the possible options.
The means of moving from procedural aggregation to
aggregation-influenced choice of law remain to be explored. Many
alternatives are possible. All of them will be difficult to
implement.
One thoughtful approach to aggregation for the purpose of
uniformity is provided by the American Law Institute's Complex
Litigation: Statutory Recommendations (1994). The project
recommends statutory provisions for transfer and consolidation
both within the federal court system and between federal and
state systems. Chapter 6 sets out choice-of-law rules for mass
torts and mass contracts. 13 The general rules are fleshed out by
more specific rules for limitations, monetary relief, and punitive
damages. The premise is that federal choice rules should be
adopted to "foster[] the fair, just, and efficient resolution" of cases
consolidated for the disposition of common claims. Establishing
binding federal law will reduce the incentives for forum shopping
and "reduce the extremely complicated inquiry now needed to
ascertain and apply the numerous state choice of law rules that
may be relevant in a consolidated action." Simply leaving matters
to authorizing development of a federal common law was put aside
for fear that federal courts might be little more able to achieve
consistent results than state courts have been, and in recognizing
that such uniformity as might emerge would be long in coming.
The ALI rules set an objective of applying a single state's
law to all similar tort or contract claims, but recognize that the
consolidated actions may be divided into subgroups of claims,
issues, or parties that "allow more than one state's law to be
applied." The possibility of subgrouping - "subclassing" in a
class-action context - is not troubling in itself. It might be
modified, however, to go a step further, to pick different sources of
law to govern closely related issues in patterns that would not be
adopted by any single law-giver. The opportunity to mix and
match laws from different sources offends many observers who
view the prospect as creating an amalgam that, being
independently recognized nowhere, is not "law" at all. And indeed
care must be taken to ensure that focus on the policies that
13. See ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.01-
6.03 (1994).
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underlie seemingly different substantive rules does not obscure a
deeper interdependence among the different substantive rules of
any single law giver. But separation may be plausible.
To illustrate the mix-and-match question, suppose a
product manufactured in a state that does not require proof of a
commercially feasible alternative design to establish design defect
and establishes a 50% bar for comparative responsibility. The
product injures consumers in many states, including some that
adhere to contributory negligence, others that impose a 50% bar or
a 51% bar, and a few that recognize pure comparative
responsibility. It may be appropriate to look to the manufacturing
state for the law of design defect as to all whom it injures; the
choice could be defended independently of aggregation, although it
is (much?) more likely to be the uniform choice with aggregation.
At the same time, it may be appropriate to adopt the law of one or
more of the injury states for comparative responsibility rules. The
most interesting possibility would be to look to the manufacturer's
state law by applying a 50% bar not only to all those affected in
the manufacturer's state and in other 50%-bar states, but also to
those affected in contributory negligence states. At the same time,
those affected in 51% bar or pure comparative responsibility states
might properly be afforded the greater protection of their own
laws.
The ALI recommendations have not been taken up by
Congress. It does not seem likely that Congress will be interested
in adopting a federal choice-of-law code, either as part of an
aggregation system or otherwise. Choice-of-law provisions were
included in the early bills that led to the single-event mass
disaster jurisdiction provisions of § 1369, but did not make it to
the final act. 14  The failed attempt to include choice-of-law
provisions in the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) is a more
recent illustration. 15 Neither does it seem likely that Congress
will be interested in legislatively overruling Klaxon, leaving
federal courts free to develop their own choice principles for
matters Erie-governed by state law. That prediction is
particularly unfortunate for § 1369 and CAFA, where federal
14. See H.R. 967, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1852, 106th Cong. (1999).
15. See S. 2083, 105th Cong. (1998); S.1712, 107th Cong.(as introduced);
S. 12, 108th Cong. (as introduced); S 1751, 108th Cong. (as introduced).
AGGREGATION AND CHOICE OF LAW
courts are deliberately used to do things state courts cannot do, or
that Congress does not want them to do.
It does not seem much more practicable to hope that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure might be called to serve this
purpose by adopting explicit choice-of-law provisions. The Rules
Enabling Act authorizes adoption of "general rules of practice and
procedure," and for good measure decrees that "such rules shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."'16 It might
be urged that authority to adopt rules for aggregating parties and
claims carries with it authority to facilitate the goals of
aggregation - and on a fair view, the goals of diversity
jurisdiction - by providing for independent federal choice
principles. The Supreme Court could do that by overruling
Klaxon. The Court also can adopt Enabling Act rules that
dramatically affect and even transform "substantive right[s]." The
class-action provisions of Civil Rule 23 have had such
transformative effects that no small number of observers argue
that significant amendments would have such substantive effects
as to be prohibited by the very Enabling Act that supported
creation of Rule 23 in the first place. The Civil Rules can, in the
pursuit of procedural ends, have dramatic, at times fatal,
consequences for substantive rights. Authorizing independent
court-developed approaches to choose among the sources of
substantive rights, for the purpose of advancing efficient
procedure, either Rule 23 class-action procedure or less dramatic
joinder rules, might well fall within the range of substantive
effects that do not count as abridging, enlarging, or modifying the
substantive rules that are affected. The aim would be to facilitate
development of good choice rules that would better implement
substantive rights - a worthy procedural goal - than could be
accomplished by the displaced choice rules.
But any attempt to adopt an Enabling Act rule that, in the
name of facilitating effective procedural aggregations, authorizes
an independent federal choice between competing state
substantive laws would be met with vigorous challenges that
would be reasonably founded, even if not ultimately convincing. It
is a peculiar characteristic of the Enabling Act process that it is
not always available to support Supreme Court adoption of a rule
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
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to accomplish results that the Court could accomplish by decision.
The rules committees, moreover, may understandably find it
better to leave a matter so fraught with state sensitivities to rise
or fall in the legislative process. The prospect of a Civil Rule
overruling Klaxon as a support for one or more of the Civil Rules
joinder provisions is vanishingly dim.
State legislation might be considered as an alternative to
federal statute or rule. Widespread state enactment would enable
aggregation-sensitive choices not only in state courts but also in a
federal court sitting in a state with the liberating legislation. An
illustration is provided by the Uniform Transfer Act. Section 105
authorizes the transferring court to state "terms of the transfer."
Section 208 authorizes the receiving court to depart from the
terms "for good cause." These provisions could be used to achieve
consolidation across state lines, addressing choice of law by terms
on the transfer; a receiving court might accede to the terms even
though it would not independently make the same choice. But the
problems of coordinating legislation among the states are
formidable. The Transfer Act has failed of adoption, most likely
for fear of even the simpler uses that would enable state courts to
supplement forum non conveniens dismissals with a more flexible
transfer device similar to § 1404(a) transfer between federal
courts. 17
So long as legislation fails, some procedural devices might
be developed to address a few situations. One device would
approach an opt-in class without awaiting adoption of an opt-in
class-action rule. A court could establish terms for the litigation,
including choice-of-law terms, and invite intervention by anyone
who wishes to join on those terms. If the defendant's consent were
obtained there would be little ground for objection, and a
defendant might well consent to a reasonable choice of law in
return for the benefits of what might turn out to be relatively
comprehensive aggregation. Even if the choice were forced on the
defendant, the achievements in uniformity and efficiency might
well justify the effort.
"Aggregation" also may be accomplished by extra-
procedural means. A single lawyer or firm, or - more
dramatically - cooperating groups of lawyers and firms, may
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000).
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represent hundreds or even thousands of clients with similar
claims. These large inventories of claims commonly are resolved
by the same means as most claims are resolved - settlement.
Settlements may include many claims that have not yet been filed
as court actions. Rules of professional responsibility create real
but surmountable difficulties.1S Another American Law Institute
Project, Principles of Aggregate Litigation, 19 is addressing these
problems. For the moment, it suffices to observe that one great
virtue of settlement is to elide choice-of-law issues. Some account
may be made in the settlement terms for different values arising
from different laws. But the exquisite inquiries a court might feel
compelled to make under general choice analysis are not likely to
stand in the way of generally fair settlement terms.
The most obvious alternative remains. Class actions could
readily justify creation of choice principles developed to seize the
special capacity of class actions to achieve uniformity and
efficiency. But obstacles remain. It is commonplace to reflect that
Civil Rule 23 has grown far beyond anything contemplated by
those who developed the 1966 amendments. The growth has come
through the cooperation of lawyers and judges in adapting the
new tool to myriad expansive uses. The same essentially common-
law process might be used to add independent choice-of-law rules
as a matter of fulfilling the inherent character and purposes of
class actions. But any such development would run directly
counter to more than four decades of resolute adherence to
traditional choice rules, including the Klaxon mandate to follow
state choice rules in diversity actions. It is beyond late in the day
to reconsider the possible implications of the present rule; the
strong arguments that would be made against any attempt to add
explicit choice-of-law provisions to Rule 23 become fully
persuasive when addressed to reconstruction of Rule 23 without
further rulemaking. Nor is it persuasive to argue that CAFA
should be interpreted to supersede Klaxon's reference to state law
because it was motivated in part by the bizarre overreaching
choices made by a small number of state courts. And even if
18. See Nancy Moore, Choice of Law for Professional Responsibility Issues
in Aggregate Litigation, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73 (forthcoming Feb.
2009); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (1983).
19. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 3.01-
3.19 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008).
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CAFA were bent to this worthy purpose, it could not reasonably be
extended to class actions that do not rest on CAFA jurisdiction.
State courts might fare better in attempting to generate new
choice rules for class actions, but the risk persists that a few
states might prove too willing to project local rules beyond
reasonable application to distant events. Although the cause is
just, and the hope for action feeble, it seems better to leave such
sensitive developments to legislation, most likely in Congress.
(2) Small-Scale Aggregation
It may seem paradoxical, but smaller-scale aggregation
presents greater challenges in making a case for shaping a choice
of law to facilitate aggregation, or for shaping aggregation to
support a preferred choice of law.
A simple example shows the difficulties. Passenger and
Driver from a joint-and-several-liability state are involved in an
accident in a several-liability state. Passenger sues Driver in
their home state. The court believes that in light of the many
local interests it should hold Driver jointly and severally liable for
all of Passenger's injuries. Driver then impleads the other driver's
employer, a citizen of the several-liability state where the accident
occurred, the defendant driver and the employer add claims
against each other for their own injuries, and the plaintiff
passenger claims against the several-liability state employer.
Choice of several liability makes obvious sense for the drivers'
claims against each other. But what of the impleader for
contribution and the passenger's claim against the employer?
Application of joint-and-several liability to the local driver,
without opportunity for contribution, would confound the
principles of both states. Why not use impleader to enable the
forum to apply its own law? The result should be a wash if both
drivers are collectible - the impleaded driver ends up paying only
the liability that would be apportioned as several liability. This
result serves efficiency, and also ensures that collecting full
damages from the local driver does not leave the local driver liable
for an entire liability that neither state would impose. But
suppose the forum driver is not collectible: can the forum properly
expand application of its joint-and-several liability rule to impose
a greater share on the other defendant? There might be some
thought that the difference between several liability and joint-
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and-several liability is a mere matter of "loss allocation,"
justifying use of the forum rule. But if that does not persuade -
and the distinction between loss-allocating and conduct-regulating
rules is slippery if it is a distinction at all - should aggregation by
impleader make a difference? My intuition is that the aggregation
should make no difference. If the passenger plaintiff would be
limited to several liability against the employer in a two-party
action, aggregation on this scale does not justify special choice
principles.
Another example may look the other way. A defendant in
State A makes discharges into a stream that runs into State B.
Ten riparian owners in A and two in B claim to be affected by
what they call pollution. If the two B plaintiffs brought a separate
action in B, application of B law could be easily justified. If the
two B plaintiffs brought a separate action in A, the choice might
reasonably go either way, depending on the full context of events
and competing laws. But what if the two B plaintiffs join in a
single action in A with the ten A plainitffs? Joinder itself might
imply consent to A's choice of A law to govern pollution liability as
to all plaintiffs, even though the court still would choose B law to
determine ownership in B. The two B plaintiffs might join in the
aggregated action because of the costs of suing alone, or because of
uncertainty as to the substance of either A law or B law. This
result could hold whether A law is more demanding than B law or
less.
CONCLUSION
These questions have been framed by asking whether the
"interests" that count for choice of law include a shared interest of
the several states (or nations) in achieving the benefits of
aggregated litigation. The procedural advantages of large-scale
aggregation seem to support a clear affirmative answer. The
procedural advantages, moreover, intertwine with the special
mutual interests of all states when large-scale events affect people
in many states. Subordination of purely local policies to the
shared interest in common treatment of all reflects a central, if
confusing, aspect of our federalism. The answer to the question
"Is this one country or what?" is many shades of "what." The
values that force respect for state autonomy in purely local
matters and that inform attempts to reconcile competing
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autonomies for discrete events may diminish as events become
increasingly regional or national in scope. On this perspective,
there indeed is a difference between large- and small-scale
aggregation. The only trick is in making appropriate distinctions.
The voluntary aspect of aggregation on a smaller scale
might seem to count in drawing the distinctions. But joinder,
voluntary as to some parties, may not be welcomed by an
adversary who prefers proceedings that are not aggregated, for
reasons of either procedure or choice of law. A temporizing
answer might be that something depends on the indeterminacy of
the choices - the advantages of aggregation can tip the balance
when the court is quite uncertain what law it would choose for a
particular two-party single claim issue. But there is something
disquieting about an approach that advances procedural values by
discounting the ability to make a cogent, much less correct, choice
of law.
Some help may be found in an analogy. There should be,
and often is, a wise two-way accommodation between procedural
capacities and substantive law. It is easy enough to adapt
procedure to the needs of specific substantive law. Those who
develop substantive law likewise should take account of the
institutions and procedures available for enforcement - elegant
theory may properly yield to the realistic limits of litigation. The
same may be true of the accommodation between procedure and
choice of law.
